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Outlawry: Ida B. Wells and Lynch Law
David Squires
Above all, lynching is about the law. 
—Robyn Wiegman, “The Anatomy of Lynching”
On April 12, 1899, just south of Atlanta, Georgia, Sam Hose killed his white employer in a dispute over wages. The local press responded immediately and aggressively, sensationalizing the crime with fabri-
cated details, even manufacturing a rape story to provoke public outrage that 
would ensure Hose’s lynching. The Atlanta Constitution ran a headline that 
predestined his fate: “Determined Mob after Hose; He Will Be Lynched If 
Caught.”1 The newspaper offered a more specific intimation in the body of the 
article: “There have been whisperings of burning at the stake and of torturing 
the fellow.”2 To ensure public excitement, the paper offered a $500 reward for 
Hose’s capture while also running editorials that warned police officers not to 
protect him.3 The nearby Newnan Herald and Advertiser meanwhile professed 
deference to regular procedures of law at the same time that it insisted on a 
special need to circumvent them: “No community in Georgia has been more 
ready, at all times and in all circumstances, to show respect for the law or yield 
obedience to the mandates of the constituted authorities, but in the present 
instance the provocation is so unbearably aggravating that the people cannot be 
expected to wait with patience on the laggard processes of the courts.”4 News 
reports wedded cries of impatience with concerns about black men raping 
white women, what the Herald described as a “carnival of blood and lust.”5 
The melodramatic reporting, akin to dime novel prose, successfully removed 
justice from the legal order and exposed Hose’s life to summary execution on 
the basis of sexual violence that never occurred.
After an extensive search and much lurid reporting, a mob burned Hose 
on April 23. The Constitution offered a capstone report whose spectacular de-
tail captures the form of violence authorized under Lynch Law: “Fully 2,000 
people surrounded the small sapling to which he was fastened and watched 
the flames eat away his flesh, saw his body mutilated by knives and witnessed 
the contortions of his body in his extreme agony.”6 Of the nearly five thousand 
lynchings between 1892 and 1944, Hose’s stands out today as one of the most 
|   142 American Quarterly
shocking not only because of the torture inflicted before his death but also 
because of the startling public excitement that transformed a manhunt into 
a form of dramatic entertainment.7 The period’s most astute and outspoken 
critic of Lynch Law, Ida B. Wells, responded to the news coverage in a short 
pamphlet that situated Hose’s murder within a “reign of outlawry” that swept 
Georgia over six weeks in March and April 1899.8 During that time twelve 
black men were lynched within fifty miles of Atlanta. Wells documented the 
Constitution’s role in the Hose case to make plain that lynching was not “the 
work of the lowest and lawless class,” as the common excuse went.9 In significant 
and material ways, the white press manufactured mob violence. “Never a word 
for law and order,” Wells lamented, “but daily encouragement for burning.”10
Because they showcase popular rationalizations of Lynch Law and its 
public execution, the Sam Hose reports provide an entry point for better 
understanding the complicated relationship between lynching and the law. If 
lynching is about the law, as Robyn Wiegman claims in her landmark essay 
“The Anatomy of Lynching,” the relationship between the two remains to be 
specified. This essay qualifies her assertion by arguing that Lynch Law suspends 
normative law in the name of popular justice. Cries for popular justice feature 
heavily in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature on lynching, yet 
recent criticism has not fully explicated how those cries enabled Lynch Law. 
Beginning with Angela Davis’s analysis of the “myth of the black rapist,” as 
she coined it in Women, Race, and Class, an impressive body of scholarship has 
explained how the cultural logic of lynching placed white businessmen at the 
top of a social structure that idealized white femininity, maligned black men 
as savages, and left black women open to sexual abuse without any recourse.11 
Wells countered the rape myth by constructing a nuanced theory of Lynch 
Law as a form of “unrestrained outlawry” that depends on law enforcement’s 
asymmetrical application across the color line.12 The somewhat antiquated 
term outlawry—used to denote the act of depriving someone of legal protec-
tions—communicates the irregular circumstances that distinguish Lynch Law 
from normative criminal law.13 Elaborating Wells’s theory of outlawry will 
clarify how lynching racialized problems of sovereignty residing at the heart 
of the American democratic project.
If Lynch Law suspends normative legal procedures, as I argue, then it per-
forms what political theorists such as Giorgio Agamben call the sovereign deci-
sion. I engage Agamben’s theory of sovereignty because its concern with lethal 
force is suggestive of lynching violence. His concept of “bare life” provocatively 
links “the originary activity of sovereignty” to the production of subjects who 
can be killed with impunity, describing a form of legal abandonment similar to 
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what Wells describes as outlawry.14 While productive for many critics interested 
in biopolitical forms of power, Agamben tends to generalize his theory of bare 
life as applicable to all legal subjects throughout the history of Western politics. 
By contrast, Wells shows how, in the United States, race becomes a crucial 
mechanism for politicizing life. Her theory of outlawry matches a structural 
analysis of law with empirical observations of law enforcement to specify how 
violence affects certain subjects before others and how the law abandons its 
obligation to protect those subjects while maintaining its capacity to punish 
them. Wells’s historically specific formulation of outlawry—situated in a period 
considered the nadir of US race relations—complicates Agamben’s theory of 
sovereignty by introducing problems unique to a federalist government.15 The 
split autonomy between state and federal governments rests on a principle of 
self-government that creates situations where overlapping juridical fields make 
competing claims to sovereign power.
The campaign of tireless activism that Wells pursued at the end of the 
nineteenth century offered a forceful counterpoint to the consensus between 
northern liberals and southern reactionaries that regarded mob violence as an 
issue that states had a right to resolve on their own terms.16 She recognized 
in Lynch Law the continuation of racially determined power over life that 
undermined the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to make 
lynching a wholly national issue. The administration of lethal violence at the 
impulse of unauthorized citizens saturated the problem of how to democratize 
citizenship and civil rights with the question of how to ensure the more radical 
right to life. Wells illustrates that problem by narrating her own experience 
with legal systems at the local, state, and national levels. The narrative of her 
exile from Memphis, Tennessee, however, does not confirm the abject power-
lessness that Agamben’s schematic formulation of absolute power and absolute 
vulnerability ascribes to bare life. Despite finding herself cast out of law’s pro-
tection, Wells posits her pamphlets on a form of defiant outlaw subjectivity 
that Agamben’s polarized account of power relations cannot accommodate. I 
elaborate that form of outlaw subjectivity first by tracing the legal history of 
Lynch Law as an exception to normative law and second by analyzing Wells’s 
early antilynching pamphlets.
Popular Sovereigns
Wiegman’s article “The Anatomy of Lynching” provides the requisite foun-
dation for understanding how cultural norms legitimate antinormative legal 
claims because it explains how racial and sexual difference contributed to 
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uneven applications of law, curtailing it in some instances while exaggerating 
it in others. She illustrates the point with an epigraph from Ralph Ellison’s 
short story “The Birth Mark.” Published in 1940, the two-page story depicts 
a white police officer protecting individuals and the state from legal scrutiny 
by reporting lynching as a car accident. When the victim’s siblings show up at 
the coroner’s office to identify their brother’s body and notice that he has been 
castrated, the officer tells them, “Just remember that a car hit ’im, and you’ll 
be all right. . . . We don’t allow no lynching round here no more.”17 With the 
police officer’s threat, Ellison neatly captures the culture of intimidation that, 
even as late as the mid-twentieth century, granted legal immunity to those 
who killed in the name of Lynch Law. Wiegman reads the sexual economy 
fundamental to lynching as doubly manifested in the form of law: “both the 
towering patrolman who renarrates the body and sadistically claims it as a 
sign of his own power, and the symbolic as law, the site of normativity and 
sanctioned desire, prohibition and taboo.”18 To understand lynching as “the 
site of normativity and sanctioned desire,” however, too neatly equates the 
law with the racial hegemony that upholds cultural norms. White policemen, 
white judges, white juries, white mayors and governors administer the law, 
exempting certain subjects and certain crimes from prosecution. However, 
the rule of law remains separate—even when not clearly distinct—from its 
embodiment. Otherwise, Ellison’s police officer would not need to cover up 
lynching as a car accident.
Public officials suppressing evidence of Lynch Law in the 1940s to avoid 
legal scrutiny makes for plausible fiction. Several states passed antilynching 
legislation during the twenties and thirties—sometimes to stay federal anti-
lynching bills, sometimes to protect business investments from the north and 
abroad. States approached the situation in various ways, ranging from indict-
ing individual lynchers to fining counties to removing responsible officials. 
By the midthirties, the leading scholarship on antilynching law concluded, 
“Our traditional forms of procedure probably need no fundamental change. 
The problem is to meet the elusive human factor in a system of good laws 
administered by fallible men.”19 Neither antilynching legislation nor procedural 
law could prevent lynching sympathizers from using their official authority 
to derail prosecution. Once defined as a crime, however, lynching became ac-
countable to normative law. Although no relief from the fact of mob violence, 
the structural assimilation of lynching as illegal represented a significant his-
torical shift away from interpretations that legitimized it as extralegal. Uneven 
applications of criminal law persisted, as Ellison’s story reminds us, but despite 
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desultory enforcement, some states implemented a structural mechanism for 
containing Lynch Law.
Prior to the passage of antilynching legislation, Wells paved the way toward 
resignifying antiblack mob violence by persistently characterizing Lynch Law 
as illegal. Calling for “punishment by law for the lawless” in the preface of 
Southern Horrors, she countered the more common understanding of lynching 
as an exception to the law fully justified on the basis of popular sovereignty.20 
Her critique of justifications of violence that appeal to the “horror of rape as 
excuse for lawlessness” foreshadows more recent critiques of sovereignty that 
emphasize the sovereign decision between norm and exception.21 One reason 
that Agamben’s theory of bare life has been useful, despite its limitations for 
understanding US federalism, is that it has inspired critics to place the ques-
tion of sovereignty at the heart of democratic governance. If sovereignty has 
remained undertheorized, as Nasser Hussain and Melissa Ptacek claim, that is 
because, “since the end of ancien régime monarchies and the rise and consoli-
dation of liberal-constitutional states, the need for such theorization has been 
considered doubtful.”22 Within the context of American studies, the doubtful 
need for a theory of sovereignty relates to two competing understandings of 
American constitutionalism. On the one hand, the Constitution of the United 
States, like other constitutions, established a set of rules as the basic framework 
for government. On the other hand, the rhetoric of revolution insisted on the 
people’s sovereign right to reject or establish government, including the legal 
processes that regulate governmental change.
Popular sovereignty, the conceptual key to justifications of Lynch Law, hangs 
in the balance between the rule of law and the right to revolution. Neither 
understanding of American governance recognizes sovereignty in a single, em-
bodied entity as Agamben does. The rule-bound framework of constitutional 
government established a diffuse form of sovereignty constrained by a set of 
checks and balances familiar today as one of the principal features upholding 
the architecture of American democracy. To take only the most salient example, 
Article 3 of the Constitution enacted the rule of law according to a standard 
system of juridical procedures: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”23 Along with the Sixth Amendment, the 
Constitution ensures that no one person will have the ability to pass grave legal 
judgments on another. To establish “a government of laws and not of men,” 
the US Constitution provides a set of rules for making and applying law.24 The 
emphasis on laws over individuals intends to bind elected officials to a system 
of rules for measuring legal validity, essentially revoking the autocratic sovereign 
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who governs without legal constraints or structural mechanisms of control. 
If the Declaration of Independence dissolved the political contract between 
a sovereign and his subjects, the Constitution reorganized power by placing 
those distinct parties under the sign of a single entity—a sovereign people.
But how does a collectivity enact sovereign power? According to Christian 
Fritz’s recent legal history, the consolidation of sovereign and subject marked 
an epochal shift: “Government was no longer something that happened to 
people. In America it now became something that the people—by their consent 
and volition—brought into being.”25 He goes on to suggest that the people’s 
“conduct and active participation” evidenced their consent as well as their 
exercise of sovereignty.26 Sovereign power in Fritz’s formulation amounts to 
active engagement with the processes of government—voting, lobbying, passing 
legislation, even recalling elections when necessary. Book-ended by the Revo-
lutionary and Civil Wars, however, and with plenty of examples of rebellion 
between, his study documents moments in US history when the normative 
processes of government gave way to insurrection. Fritz’s historical examples 
show what happens when the people stop obeying laws that they supposedly 
authorize. Calibrated to explain normative legal operations, his liberal theory 
of popular sovereignty fails to account for the power to suspend government 
or to constitute new government, two powers that popular sovereignty would 
grant the body politic whenever existing government ceases to serve its interests.
Because lynch mobs undermined constitutional authority, a nonliberal 
account of sovereign power will better explain Lynch Law’s relationship to 
normative legal procedures. Carl Schmitt, a juridical thinker who has gained 
attention for his antinormative theory of sovereignty, begins his 1922 tract 
Political Theology with a definition: “Sovereign is he who decides on the ex-
ception.”27 Hinging on exceptions to normative law, that definition locates 
sovereignty less in the power to make subjects obey rules than in the capacity 
to decide what constitutes an emergency warranting action beyond the rules. 
Locating sovereignty in the decision to suspend constitutional law revises the 
traditional understanding of sovereign right over life and death—force applied 
to life—to emphasize instead the capacity to withdraw law from life. Describ-
ing what ancient legal traditions designate as outlawry, Agamben explains the 
relationship as one of abandonment: “He who has been banned is not, in fact, 
simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned 
by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, 
outside and inside, become indistinguishable.”28 Without exactly falling out-
side the reach of law, the outlaw remains in complex relation to the juridical 
order because the dissolution of legal protections leaves her vulnerable to 
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violence. Expressed as the capacity to suspend law, sovereign power produces 
life that can be killed with impunity. Connecting the sovereign exception to 
lethal violence makes clear the high stakes of suspending law in the name of 
justice. Yet, despite theorizing sovereignty according to specific borderline cases 
rather than routine operations, Schmitt’s definition moves toward a totalizing 
understanding of sovereign power that ignores practical limitations and chal-
lenges to political control.
The origin of Lynch Law provides a clear example of how actions beyond 
the purview of government, even when aimed at protecting state authority, can 
create an uneasy relationship between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty. 
The Charles Lynch archive offers us the most likely history for the term as a 
form of extralegal martial law. In the summer of 1780 Lynch, a local magistrate 
and colonel in the Virginia militia, led an excursion to protect Virginia’s lead 
mines from British loyalists. Having rounded up a number of suspects, he or-
ganized a summary trial that ended with the execution of accused ringleaders 
and whippings for the rest. Although the Virginia Assembly decided in 1782 
that the imminence of danger justified Lynch’s actions, surviving letters from 
wartime governor Thomas Jefferson suggest that the head of state regarded the 
situation with ambivalence. He found it difficult to disagree that an emergency 
at the frontier of Virginian territory, far from any court authorized to try cases 
of treason, forced a distinction between due process and justice. At the same 
time Jefferson approved of Lynch’s actions, however, he asked Lynch to “take 
care” that the accused Tories “be regularly tried afterwards.”29 Although not 
legally declared a state of emergency, Jefferson’s qualification of afterwards set a 
temporal boundary common to martial law mandates. If emergency conditions 
necessitated summary judgment, the rule of law demanded that when those 
conditions passed, justice once again required due process. By establishing 
the imminence of danger as grounds for otherwise illegal action, the Lynch 
case introduced the conceptual other of democratically legitimated procedural 
law—a state of exception that permits immediate, extralegal violence.
Emerging concurrently with the new nation’s endeavors to establish a 
constitutional system of rule, both at the state and at the federal levels, Lynch 
Law left open the question of sovereignty that shadows popular government. 
By declaring emergency conditions in rural Virginia, Charles Lynch did more 
than threaten the life of certain loyalists—he threatened the rationality of legal 
justice in an inchoate democracy. But if Lynch demonstrated his capacity to 
decide on the exception, it neither proved him sovereign in Virginia nor threat-
ened Jefferson’s governorship. One might argue this point by maintaining that 
Lynch did, in fact, exercise sovereignty within a small territory on the frontier 
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of Virginia. Such a partitioning of sovereign power, however, would fail to ac-
count for the overlapping jurisdictions indispensable to American federalism. 
By establishing municipalities inside states inside a nation, a federalist govern-
ment allows for competing claims on authority, especially during moments 
of unrest or change that unsettle the hierarchy of powers. Lynch’s decision to 
employ martial law, for instance, required him as the Bedford County mag-
istrate to enact sovereign power even as he claimed it for the Commonwealth 
of Virginia; and as follows in a democratic republic, that claim assumed the 
authority of the people even as it originated from an individual’s illicit judg-
ment. Lynch’s decision functioned by necessity to distinguish the people (those 
who acted in the interest of self-government) from the seditious (those who 
assumed the king’s ultimate authority), a separation that only became starker 
with the racialization of Lynch Law.
In the wake of momentous constitutional changes after the Civil War, 
Lynch Law shifted from the extralegal administration of punishment during 
an emergency to become a more specific tool for policing the color line. Yet the 
same logic underpinning Revolutionary era claims to popular sovereignty—the 
people substantiate law, so the people can repudiate it—continued to surface 
as an explanation for contravening criminal and constitutional law. At the 
historical moment when its application took shape as systematic antiblack 
violence, for example, Hubert H. Bancroft justified Lynch Law as enacting 
“the right of the governed at all times to instant and arbitrary control of the 
government.”30 Bancroft, contemporary with Wells, provides the most elaborate 
apology for Lynch Law in his two-volume history of vigilance committees in 
California and other Western territories where, he reports, he witnessed the 
exercise of arbitrary power “operating under certain conditions to the welfare 
of society.”31 The conditions he had in mind were the inchoate and somewhat 
dysfunctional legal systems common during the gold rush years when, as he put 
it, “every man carried a pistol; whiskey was fiery; shooting was easy.”32 Despite 
the book’s historical content, however, its publication year—1887—situated 
Bancroft’s theory of popular justice within national debates about legitimate 
exercises of power after Reconstruction.
In that context, Bancroft rethought the conditions that had legitimated 
arbitrary power during the Revolution in significant ways. His formulation of 
the right existing “at all times,” for example, erased the temporal border that 
typically limits martial law. In fact, Bancroft expressed scant concern for the 
checks and balances implemented by procedural law. Disregard for the content 
and purpose of legal proceedings enabled him to reimagine popular tribunals, 
conducted by self-appointed vigilance committees, as consistent with norma-
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tive laws. Unlike other “aberrations of justice” in which “there is something of 
government by faction, or of military rule, or of rebellion against the powers 
that be,” Bancroft sees in the so-called vigilance committee a profound respect 
for the supremacy of law.33 Vigilance committees, he argues, fulfill the people’s 
obligation, “whenever they see the laws which they have made trampled upon, 
distorted, or prostituted, to rise in their sovereign privilege and remove such 
unfaithful servants, lawfully if possible, arbitrarily if necessary.”34 Characterizing 
popular justice as “friendly with the law,” Bancroft attempts to establish conti-
nuity between unauthorized punishment and legally established criminal law by 
identifying government officials, rather than governmental form, as corrupt.35 
In other words, he argues that Vigilance—his term for Lynch Law—preserves 
normative law by supplementing and supplanting its procedures. The burden 
of proof for his argument should fall on demonstrating elected officials’ cor-
ruption, but as Manfred Berg notes in his recent history of lynching, “Bancroft 
conveniently ignored the facts of his own materials,” which pointed toward 
competing interests and vengeance as often as vigilance.36
The plausibility of Bancroft’s argument relied less on proving government 
corruption than on the frontier setting of his historical evidence. He borrows 
from the Charles Lynch narrative to situate Lynch Law always at the edge of 
civilization, following western expansion into territory where “the spirit of evil 
was ever strong, and government weak.”37 Like many newspaper columnists, 
Bancroft argued that Lynch Law would wither in the face of a robust legal 
system, more courts, or salaried enforcement agents.38 His tome, however, 
advocated “popular justice” at exactly the moment, according to lynching 
statistics, when Lynch Law took hold of the Southeast where it applied dis-
proportionately to African Americans.39 If at one time Lynch Law functioned 
in the absence of law at the margins of policeable territory, by 1887 it had 
moved well within established legal jurisdictions. During the last decade of 
the nineteenth century the number of lynchings increased dramatically in 
developed urban areas such as Atlanta and Memphis, recognized at the time 
as burgeoning centers of southern civilization. Yet, even as late as 1908, the 
liberal journalist Ray Stannard Baker reported in his book Following the Color 
Line that lynching, in both the South and the North, resulted from “corrupt 
politics, vile saloons, the law paralysed by non-enforcement against vice, a 
large venal Negro vote, lax courts of justice.”40 Although critical of Lynch Law, 
Baker insisted that mob violence served to correct “delays and technicalities of 
the law” that allowed murderers to go free.41 This insistence despite his own 
example of two men in Georgia who, sentenced to hang, were dragged from 
the courthouse and burned alive.42
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Within established legal jurisdictions, Lynch Law functioned neither as the 
exception that protected law (Bancroft’s theory) nor as a correction to inefficient 
law (Baker’s theory) but as a suspension of certain applications of law. The 
white hegemony executing state laws provides a crucial clue as to the shape of 
that suspension; it created an asymmetrical field of justice that rendered mob 
violence unpunishable while their black victims, justly or not, answered to fully 
operative criminal enforcement.43 Appeals to popular sovereignty, in concert 
with unequal applications of law, gratuitously determined the people as white 
people. Especially when articulated as the prerogative of a local community 
to flout constitutional law—as in the case with Sam Hose—claims to popular 
sovereignty justified mob action by excluding African Americans from the body 
politic while still subjecting them to its control. Unlike slave codes that enforced 
exclusion by law, however, Lynch Law pursued it by suspending the federal 
laws that had only recently incorporated African Americans into the citizenry.
The fact that Lynch Law answered the democratization of citizenship with 
publicly justified violence suggests that it neither nullifies nor supports nor-
mative law but suspends aspects of law in the name of popular justice. In this 
formulation, justice has a double significance that closer attention to Wells’s 
writings will help elaborate. In brief, it brackets the avowals of righteousness 
that accompanied defenses of Lynch Law, especially those that insisted lynching 
protected women’s dignity. More structurally, justice became the overarching 
value Lynch Law solicited with the assumption that legal proceedings impeded 
its administration. Wells, however, offers a counterformulation of justice that 
rejects antinormative claims to sovereignty. The examples that Wells uses 
to substantiate her critique of Lynch Law complicate Agamben’s suggestion 
that bare life resides at points of indistinction—simultaneously included and 
excluded from law—by showing how civil protections receded from African 
Americans living under Jim Crow while criminal law continued to apply in 
full force. Recognizing the asymmetrical operations of normative law helped 
Wells identify the material and economic consequences that Lynch Law had 
for those always under its threat of violence. Having outlined the theoretical 
claims surrounding Lynch Law, I turn now to the material concerns provoked 
by its application.
Outlaws
Wells discovered firsthand the material consequences of Lynch Law. Southern 
Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases tells the story of her exile from Memphis, 
Tennessee, where she had lived for nearly ten years, working as a schoolteacher 
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and, later, as co-owner and editor of the weekly paper Free Speech and Head-
light. She used the Free Speech to decry mob violence against African Ameri-
cans as well as to contest the commonly accepted account of sexual violence 
as its cause. In response to her editorializing, Memphis whites destroyed her 
paper and threatened to lynch her if she ever returned. A substantial body of 
scholarship going back to the early 1980s has addressed Wells’s exile and her 
critique of the myth of the black rapist. Yet, perhaps because her exegesis of 
the rape myth has proved so riveting for recent scholars thinking about the 
interplay between ideology and subjectivity, few critics have theorized Wells’s 
own subject position as an author.44 As a would-be victim of Lynch Law, she 
formulated her critique of mob violence from the perspective of a black woman 
doubly threatened by the law.
By the time she arrived in New York City from Memphis, state laws in the 
South had prevented her from riding in the first-class train car, while municipal, 
state and federal laws had failed to protect her life and her property. In short, 
the law subjected her to a subordinate socio-juridical position based on race, 
which capacitated Lynch Law to isolate her from legal protections. That dual 
relationship to the law constructed her subjectivity so that participation in 
American politics, rather than exercising popular sovereignty, as Fritz would 
have it, left her life exposed to the threats of lynching by Memphis business-
men. In writing Southern Horrors, Wells rendered a complex legal subjectivity 
legible by narrativizing her exile from Memphis. That narrative broadens the 
narrow possibilities for reading her merely as the juridical order would dictate 
by situating her as an author-outlaw.
The story of her exile begins several months before she left Memphis when 
she first witnessed Lynch Law. Between two and three o’clock in the morn-
ing on March 9, 1892, Thomas Moss, Calvin McDowell, and Henry Stewart 
were taken from their jail cells and shot to death in a field north of Memphis. 
Several years earlier, the three men, friends of Wells’s, opened a cooperative 
grocery store in a predominantly black neighborhood called the Curve. As 
Wells explains with a critical nod toward accommodationist politics, “They 
believed the problem [of racial discrimination] was to be solved by eschewing 
politics and putting money in the purse.”45 She complicates her own assess-
ment of their political ambitions, however, by noting the claim to citizenship 
recognizable in the store’s name and location: People’s Grocery Company, 
across the street from a white-owned grocer.
Until then, the white owner, Will Barrett, held a neighborhood monopoly 
that the new store threatened. Using a minor altercation as pretext for threaten-
ing People’s Grocery, Barrett promised to “clean them out.”46 Because the store 
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sat a mile beyond city limits, the men could not apply for police protection 
and so intended to defend themselves. The following Saturday night Barrett 
arrived with a posse of twelve men; Moss, McDowell, and Stewart opened fire 
as soon as the posse crossed the store’s rear threshold. When the smoke cleared, 
three white men—police officers, it turned out—were wounded and the black 
men had escaped. Memphis law enforcement arrested about thirty men on 
conspiracy charges related to the shootout, including the owners of People’s 
Grocery. While they sat in jail, the wounded police officers recovered, which, 
as Wells explains, inconvenienced the plans already set in motion: “There 
was no law on the statute books which would execute an Afro-American for 
wounding a white man, but the ‘unwritten law’ did.”47
Wells protested the lynching and the roundup of “conspirators” in the Free 
Speech. Noting that mobs not only killed the owners of People’s Grocery but 
also ransacked their business, the paper made a case for mass exodus. “There 
is only one thing left that we can do,” the leading editorial read that week, 
“save our money and leave a town which will neither protect our lives and 
property, nor give us a fair trial in the courts, but takes us out and murders us 
in cold blood when accused by white persons.”48 Wells explains in her autobi-
ography that her friends’ lynchings changed the course of her life. The event 
opened her eyes to the fact that Lynch Law, rather than a response to rape, 
enabled the violent mechanism of mob rule “to get rid of Negroes who were 
acquiring wealth and property and thus keep the race terrorized.”49 The last 
decade of the nineteenth century saw Lynch Law enter its modern phase as a 
form of terrorism.50 Realizing that, Wells crafted a two-pronged antilynching 
campaign. She continued encouraging black residents of Memphis to go west 
to Oklahoma, despite pressure from white business owners who suffered a 
decrease in patronage, and began investigating lynchings reported by the white 
press. The record of reporting she uncovered showed that newspapers skewed, 
sometimes fabricated, stories to connect lynching to rape regardless of whatever 
charges initially drummed up a mob. When she identified rape charges as an 
“old threadbare lie,” insinuating that white women had consensual sex with 
black men, Wells gave Memphis businessmen exactly the excuse they needed 
to destroy her press.
In keeping with Lynch Law, the white press both encouraged the plunder of 
another growing black business and threatened the proprietors’ lives. Memphis’s 
Daily Commercial reprinted the offending editorial to note that its “obscene 
intimations” had brought Southern whites “to the very outermost limit of public 
patience.” The evening paper echoed sentiments recorded in the Commercial 
and raised the ante by insisting, “Patience under such circumstances is not a 
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virtue.”51 The same day the white press threatened the Free Speech editors, a 
group of Memphis’s leading businessmen met at the Cotton Exchange Build-
ing to organize the destruction of the weekly newspaper. After wrecking the 
type and furnishings, they left a note threatening death to anyone who rebuilt 
the paper. The sheriff took charge of what remained of the business and sold 
it to satisfy creditors.52 Wells experienced what Agamben calls bare life at the 
threshold between the sibling fictions of public patience and popular justice. 
However, rather than render the boundaries of law indistinct, as Agamben 
describes, Wells’s narrative of exile shows how that threshold relied on unmis-
takable discriminations of law enforcement. Police played similar roles in the 
devastation of both Wells’s press and her friends’ grocery store, stepping aside 
to allow mob action while ensuring white economic interests.
In an era prior to the codification of the color line through Jim Crow laws, 
Lynch Law became a means for policing the racialized order organized under 
slavery. Because federal law moved to protect African Americans as full citizens 
after emancipation, however, Lynch Law relied on cultural stereotypes to fuse 
the rhetoric of emergency with the logic of popular sovereignty. The Daily 
Commercial, for instance, played on common assumptions of moral laxity 
among blacks by characterizing the anonymous Free Speech writer as a “black 
scoundrel.” Publishing “loathsome and repulsive calumnies” about lynching, 
the Daily Commercial argued, the black-owned paper aimed at “arousing the 
worst passions of their kind.”53 The specter of collective “passions” among 
the black populace and the perceived insult to white women constituted an 
emergency, according to the editorial’s reasoning, and validated any violence 
visited on Wells’s body. Although she escaped physical harm, Memphis’s evening 
paper publicly detailed the form of violence in question: “Tie the wretch who 
utters these calumnies to a stake at the intersection of Main and Madison Sts., 
brand him in the forehead with a hot iron and perform upon him a surgical 
operation with a pair of tailor’s shears.”54
The misappellation of gender in this case foregrounds the pervasive threat 
of castration, brazenly announcing the cultural conditions of sex panic that 
permitted public assent to Lynch Law. The Free Speech editorial that brought 
on such vitriol, written by Wells but published anonymously, identified the 
panic-stricken “new alarm about raping white women” as an “old racket.”55 By 
describing the “new alarm” as an “old racket,” Wells connected rape allegations 
to an ongoing project of political domination. Castration, in Wiegman’s read-
ing, completes the political violence by symbolizing the feminization of black 
men, effectively barring them from claims to full citizenship much as women 
could not claim suffrage.56 If castration negates the symbolic possibility of grant-
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ing black men political rights or patriarchal privileges, David Marriott usefully 
diagnoses the assumptions that make the emasculating symbolism operative. 
Castrating lynch victims, Marriott writes in On Black Men, “serves to reveal, 
and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness 
and sexual guilt.”57 The word guilt registers here in Marriott’s psychoanalytic 
lexicon, but it resonates with the legal meaning because Lynch Law bypasses 
the formal question of judgment. Skipping the process of adjudication, lynch 
mobs move on the presumption of guilt directly to the execution of a death 
sentence. As Wells’s investigations of lynch reports made clear, black male 
sexuality constituted both the ostensible provocation to and the object of 
violence carried out beyond the law.
The racial and sexual markings of Lynch Law in Memphis performed a 
double negation of Wells’s political subjectivity. Claims to popular sovereignty 
abstracted her from the normative protections of the law, exposing her life 
and property to mob violence, while the misrecognition of her sex registered 
a symbolic violence that disavowed the legibility of her political actions as a 
black woman. The newspapers calling for her lynching regarded every foray 
into the public sphere at municipal and state levels as a threat to orderly rela-
tions rather than viable action.58 Perhaps ironically, her experience as a witness 
to and victim of Lynch Law in 1892 opened up a space for self-recognition 
beyond the widely circulated symbolic values validating mob violence. Before 
her personal encounter with Lynch Law, Wells accepted the idea “that although 
lynching was irregular and contrary to law and order, unreasoning anger over 
the terrible crime of rape led to the lynching.”59 In exile, however, Wells rec-
ognized that rape charges were meant to short-circuit the legal safeguard of a 
fair trial. As she explains it, “The Christian world feels, that while lynching is 
a crime, and lawlessness and anarchy the certain precursors of a nation’s fall, 
it can not by word or deed, extend sympathy or help to a race of outlaws.”60 
Here, as in her editorial, Wells puts pressure on the ostensible provocation 
of Lynch Law to point out that the declaration of emergency, while seeming 
to diagnose a factual situation, suspends the order it describes as absent. The 
quote draws attention to the incongruity between the lawless mobs and the 
“race of outlaws.” Her readers might assume that outlaws perpetuate the spirit 
of unrestrained outlawry, that they are the agents of lawlessness. Wells shows, 
to the contrary, that the figure of the outlaw is predicated on the lawlessness 
of lynching.
The outlaw figure in Wells’s writing weds her critique of Lynch Law as 
illegal to the narrative account of her own subject position as a displaced 
victim of lynching. In the preface to Southern Horrors, Wells writes, having 
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already informed readers of the circumstances leading to her exile, “It is with 
no pleasure I have dipped my hands in the corruption here exposed.”61 Yet, 
driven from her home, the unpleasant task of detailing lawless violence “seems 
to have fallen upon” her despite any reservations she maintained.62 Jacqueline 
Goldsby argues that Wells’s prefatory remarks situate “Southern Horrors as an 
autobiographical-eyewitness narrative, but one whose authority proceeds from 
the writer’s vulnerability to the violence of lynching.”63 Whereas Goldsby sug-
gests that, in calling attention to the displeasures of writing Southern Horrors, 
Wells meant to parody stunt journalism’s theatricalization of bodies in distress, 
I prefer to read her hesitancy as an index of sincere recognition that the violent 
“corruption here exposed” had already exposed her body to its power before she 
sat down to write. Wells portrays herself as an unwilling author not because the 
pamphlet fouled her as a condition of its existence but because the conditions 
of her authorship had circumscribed whatever political subjectivity remained 
available through writing. The narrative account of her run-in with Lynch 
Law dramatized the discrepant domains of authority, both legal and otherwise, 
that put her in the unenviable position of an outlaw writing against outlawry.
The circumstances of Wells’s exile stripped her of basic legal protections in 
the same way that she writes of one lynching victim being “stripped naked, 
his clothing literally torn from his body.”64 Denuded of any legal covering that 
would protect her life and property, Wells nonetheless cultivated the insight 
that injury imparted to cover herself in what she termed “an array of facts.”65 
Her use of the word array plays on its multiple significances, invoking both 
the militaristic connotation of an ordered arrangement of ranks and the more 
literary meaning of elaborate clothing. Having given readers a spectral image 
of herself stripped bare in the heart of downtown Memphis and subjected to 
public castration, Wells assertively redresses the injustice by weaving together a 
fabric of facts and examples to refute the myths upholding Lynch Law. Starting 
with the case of Mrs. J. S. Underwood—a white woman from Cleveland who 
confessed to falsely accusing William Offett of rape—Wells cites a total of ten 
incidents reported by the white press that detail consensual affairs between 
white women and black men. She describes white women across class lines, 
from the “demi-monde” to the “crème de la crème,” who dared to love black 
men.66 Although a few of those women accused their lovers of rape to avoid 
disgrace, the very newspapers that loudly championed lynchings in other 
cases printed evidence of illicit, but willing, interracial sex. The final case that 
she cites bridges the narrative of her exile and the story of People’s Grocery, 
reminding readers of the economic impact of Lynch Law: “Ebenzer Fowler, 
the wealthiest colored man in Issaquena County, Miss., was shot down on the 
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street in Mayersville, January 30, 1885, just before dark by an armed body of 
white men who filled his body with bullets.”67 According to the report of his 
death, he had exchanged notes with a white woman.
Establishing the fact of consensual sex between black men and white women 
helped Wells refute fashionable notions of racial primitivism by redrawing 
the black outlaw along contours traced by white lawlessness. The numerous 
lynching cases she cites in Southern Horrors and other pamphlets—involving 
accusations ranging from rape to sassiness—complicate depictions of the outlaw 
figure that grew popular after the Civil War and whose legacy we still live with 
in the form of romanticized images of the Wild West. Dime novels and pulp 
magazines of the late nineteenth century, as Richard Slotkin shows, formal-
ized folklore by associating outlaws with the western frontier and opposing 
them to urban, law-enforcing detectives back east. “American frontiersmen 
have become outlaws,” Slotkin explains, “because they had been reared in a 
culture that places personal honor, proud ‘manhood,’ and an intuitive code 
of ‘justice’ above the rationalism and restrictions of civilized law.”68 Writers 
such as Hubert Bancroft similarly associated Lynch Law with the untamed 
frontier and described those dispensing it as paragons of masculinity demon-
strating “their honesty, good sense, and manliness.”69 Wells’s record of cases, 
by contrast, shows that after abolition, Lynch Law “left the out-of-the-way 
places” to stalk “in broad daylight in large cities, the centers of civilization,” 
with encouragement from prominent citizens and newspapers.70 Whereas 
dime novels mythologized outlaws as folk heroes, ever courageous in resisting 
conventions of the modern world, the outlaws populating lynching districts 
more often acceded to normative legal orders. Despite prejudicial treatment, 
they hoped to achieve economic security and political equality.
Churchgoing, law-abiding, middle-class men—Thomas Moss, for ex-
ample—made compelling counterexamples to slurs of racial inferiority such 
as the claim, published in the Memphis Evening Scimitar of June 4, 1892, that 
“the Negro’s lack of manners” followed from “a bestial perversion of instinct.”71 
The rhetoric of Lynch Law may have targeted “the Negro tough,” as the same 
Scimitar article put it, but its application punished African Americans for turn-
ing the equality promised by law into a social practice, whether that practice 
manifested as some measure of economic success, self-defense, or sexual liberty. 
Thomas Moss and Ebenzer Fowler exemplify the shortcomings of racial uplift, 
a theory of social progress that emphasized material and moral improvement 
over political action.72 As Wells explains, “Thoughtful Afro-Americans with 
the strong arm of the government withdrawn and with the hope to stop such 
wholesale massacres urged the race to sacrifice its political rights for sake of 
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peace. They honestly believed the race should fit itself for government, and 
when that should be done, the objection to race participation in politics would 
be removed.”73 The problem, however, came down to a failure of political repre-
sentation, not a failure of morals. Wells’s theory of Lynch Law as motivated by 
economic interests, rather than the emergency of rampant crime, explains why 
eschewing politics in favor of economic development left African Americans 
at the “mercies of the solid South.”74 The South did not need Lynch Law to 
punish illegal behavior so much as to halt a shifting social order personified by 
enterprising black business owners who, far from snubbing the normative order, 
prospered under the rules of fair competition. As Wells’s exile narrative makes 
plain, fair competition fell victim to Lynch Law just as individuals did because 
normative law failed to protect African Americans and their business interests.
The disjuncture between the supposed sexual motivation for Lynch Law 
and its manifest effects clarifies why Wells theorizes the black outlaw as the 
product, rather than agent, of outlawry. Her writing shows how mob violence 
enacted antinormative claims to popular sovereignty that, de facto, defined 
African Americans as noncitizens subject to punishment by law without any 
guarantee of legal protection. Rather than turn away from Wells’s treatment 
of sexual norms, however, the attempt to explicate a racialized subject in dual 
relation to law pertains to, and will hopefully illuminate, her treatment of sex 
across the color line. As the numerous examples in Southern Horrors establish, 
consensual sex did in fact occur between black men and white women, although 
those relationships usually remained clandestine to protect the male party from 
violence. Wells makes clear that Lynch Law operates as an extension of the 
miscegenation laws of the South, which “only operate against the legitimate 
union of the races.”75 Miscegenation laws, predating and outliving Jim Crow 
laws, ensured that any white woman involved in an interracial relationship 
placed herself, as Wells writes, “at once beyond the pale of society and within 
the clutches of the law.”76 Her phrasing alerts readers to the complex, yet dis-
tinct, structure of law at the nexus between sex and race. Like the black outlaws 
produced by Lynch Law, miscegenation laws stripped white women of whatever 
social status their whiteness granted. Subject to normative law, however, white 
women did not expose their lives to lethal violence as did their black lovers, 
who found themselves subject to both miscegenation law and Lynch Law.
Miscegenation laws factored into Wells’s critique of Lynch Law in part be-
cause they provided motivation for white women to cry rape if discovered in 
an illegal tryst. They also provide an important example of how asymmetrical 
applications of law linked cultural norms to antinormative legal practices. The 
concern for racial and moral purity professed in calls to protect white women’s 
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virtue did not extend to the treatment of black women. Wells’s research shows 
that miscegenation laws left “the white man free to seduce all the colored girls 
he can,” such as in the case of Ellerton L. Dorr, a cotton merchant who escaped 
indictment for attempted rape of an African American woman because he was 
drunk at the time of the crime.77 At a historical moment when leading an-
thropologists espoused the scientific theory that racial mixing “entails indelible 
degradation” of biological and moral qualities, Wells pointed to a long history 
of legalized rape under slavery.78 Throwing white anxieties over interracial sex 
into ironic relief, she submits “the record, as it is written in the faces of the 
million mulattoes in the South,” as self-evident proof of fornication and rape.79
Elsewhere Wells explains that her own family history contributed to “the 
record” of interracial sex.80 Her father was the son of his master, linking her 
memories of early family life to sexual violence sanctioned under the system of 
chattel slavery into which she was born. Reminding readers that slave owners 
exploited biological reproduction as a method for increasing property, Wells 
drew a common thread through the different forms of sexual oppression under 
slavery, Lynch Law, and miscegenation laws. Each operated under assumptions 
of racial alterity to employ sex as a mechanism in the political machinery 
aimed at apprehending and controlling black life. The deadly racial politics 
that emerged in the wake of Reconstruction’s curtailment led Wells to place 
the charge of outlawry and sexual transgression at the feet of the white busi-
ness class. The representative men clambering to the apex of moral authority 
and civility, she argued, constituted the primary threat to sexual purity and 
legal order.
“Life Itself”
By mid-twentieth century, the work that Wells’s antilynching pamphlets ini-
tiated had taken hold well enough that public sentiment had turned against 
lynching and, as one congressional publication explained, driven it “under-
ground.”81 Largely because of Wells’s campaign to educate British cotton 
investors, Lynch Law became a political embarrassment and an economic 
liability. After Reconstruction’s collapse and before Jim Crow’s rise, however, 
the complementary yet contentious coupling of criminal law and Lynch Law 
positioned black life at the crux of power struggles between local, state, and 
federal interests. At the beginning of the period, like many people heartened 
by the civil rights acts passed during Reconstruction, Wells believed progressive 
legal measures would protect African Americans from the social and cultural 
legacy of slavery. Not long after Reconstruction ended, she wrote in her per-
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sonal journal, “I have firmly believed all along that the law was on our side and 
would, when we appealed to it, give us justice.”82 Consistent disappointment 
with legal procedures at state and local levels throughout the late 1880s, how-
ever, damaged her optimism. As a witness to the rising tide of deadly violence 
under Lynch Law, Wells recognized the need to “agitate and act” beyond legal 
appeals to prevent the white-dominated political order from “encroaching 
more and more upon our rights—nay upon life itself.”83
In the above formulation, civil and political rights give way to the more 
pressing question of how to secure the right to life. Maximized for rhetorical 
effect, Wells’s emphasis on “life itself ” communicates an awareness of what 
Agamben has more recently categorized as bare life. Not merely biological, 
bare life designates the political condition of a subject stripped of civil rights 
who retains only the capacity to be killed. The familiar figure of the outlaw 
plays a role in Wells’s antilynching pamphlets that captures Agamben’s sense 
of bare life, yet, despite her vulnerability, Wells never assumed a position of 
powerlessness. Writing as an outlaw about the production of outlaws, she 
provides a historical case that complicates the polarized positions of absolute 
power and absolute vulnerability outlined in Agamben’s schema. Recogniz-
ing that the juridical order would not protect African Americans in a cultural 
climate governed by racist anxieties over “Negro domination” and “racial 
purity,” Wells dedicated significant attention to the importance of planned 
resistance in the public sphere or, as she titles the final chapter of Southern 
Horrors, “Self-Help.” Despite every disadvantage conferred by their outlaw 
status, she encourages African Americans to “employ the boycott, emigra-
tion and the press” to combat Lynch Law.84 The three-pronged antilynching 
program highlights important aspects of her own experience with and against 
Lynch Law, confirming that her pamphlets perform the work they endorse by 
sounding off her defiant vulnerability.
The seeming paradox of Wells’s defiance and avowed defenselessness has 
caused some critics to suspect that aspects of her antilynching pamphlets en-
tertain conservative ideas for reform. That line of thinking reads her demand 
for “punishment by law for the lawless” as tacit acceptance of the thoroughly 
corrupt juridical order that steps aside to let Lynch Law rule in its stead.85 
While many of her contemporaries—the liberal Ray Stannard Baker and the 
conservative Hubert Howe Bancroft—similarly read Lynch Law as an excep-
tion to the rule of normative law, Wells falls outside that easy left-to-right 
political spectrum. Lynch Law, she argues, does not constitute an enactment 
of popular sovereignty, as its apologists claim. Rather, Wells takes the stronger 
position that Lynch Law operates simultaneously and in tandem with state and 
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municipal law in a violent attempt “to correct the mistake of general govern-
ment.”86 In Wells’s reading, the threat of Lynch Law extended beyond local 
or regional politics because its claim to popular sovereignty undermined the 
constitutional promise of citizenship, most notably the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s assurance that no state shall deprive any person of life, property, or the 
equal protections of the law. Appealing to the “American people to demand 
justice,” as she does in Southern Horrors, Wells makes explicit that Lynch 
Law subverts the legitimacy of constitutional governance among the United 
States.87 Federal legislators never answered the call to guarantee the Constitu-
tion’s democratization of citizenship, effectively reneging on the promise of 
abolition. Wells, however, answered the threat to African American life by 
recommending that “a Winchester rifle should have a place of honor in every 
black home, and it should be used for that protection which the law refuses 
to give.”88 To infer from her theorization of Lynch Law and her call to arms, 
Wells regarded mob violence not as a form of corrective popular government 
but as an instantiation of civil war.89
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